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across north africa beginning with egypt, i've asked our speakers to limit the remarks to roughly seven minutes in order to reserve plenty of time for your questions and answers. dr. anthony and the organizers as always have provided with a series of thought-provoking questions, and as with previous panels, question cards we available to you. so first, i'd like to call on karim who is a visiting professor, and served as a great egyptian diplomat with direct experience in egypt's diplomacy towards middle east regional security, arms control and nonproliferation issues. is also a veteran of the egyptian information and political military affairs office here in washington. so it offers a unique insight into the delicate relationship new leaders find themselves maneuvering in. mr. haggag, thank you. >> thank you, and i'd like to thank the council for this opportunity. it's a pleasure to be here with you today. i'd like to focus my remarks on foreign policy, particularly the challenges facing the new egyptian government in the foreign policy and region security realm, but i can set the conce
passionate love affair while in cape town and they reached u.s. and egypt on september 3, 1942. i should probably give a little background on the war in africa. when historians talk about it can use metaphors like pendulum, it was this peculiar sort of rhythm of war that began in the fall of 1940. mussolini had visions of grandeur, he wanted to ride his streets down the roads of cairo and he decided to attack the british doing it. the british attacked back and drove the italians pretty far west into libya, at which point hitler realized that he really needed to bail out, although don't think he was happy about it. so he sent in or when ronald, along with a bunch of others and he effectively drove the british back into egypt. now, when the summer rolled around, things will quiet down and it was terribly hot. the campaigning with its glory would stop. they would advance then into libya in hopes of driving the forces back. ronald turned around and press the british back again. all the latest time, sort of disastrously, into egypt, deeper than they had ever been before. so when the american
that the famous tank commander along with a bunch of panthers and effectively drove the british back into egypt. now when the summer rolls around things quiet down and it's terribly hot and they would seize the two sides to begin, and then in the fall of 1941 there was again advanced by the british into libya in hopes of driving back the forces he turned around and pushed the british back again and all the way this time sort of disastrously all the way deep into egypt, deeper than they had ever been before. so, when the american soldiers arrived, the allies i should say and the axis forces were dug in and testing each other in a place which was about 60 miles west of alexandria close enough to alexandria which was the british naval center in egypt close enough to cairo to be really extremely dangerous and i think frightening to all the allies on the suez canal or the middle eastern oil fields and just as they are now, there were critical to the british war effort so it was a tense moment and important and on september september 3rd they steamed up the red sea, unloaded and went off to the train
, tunisia and egypt. the u.s. institute of peace post this to our discussion. >> good morning, everyone. i am steven heydemann, middle east initiative at the u.s. institute of peace and we are delighted to see you all here at today's session on security sector reform in the arab world. i think some of those who rsvp may have been scared away by the false rumor that you would be subjected to a political polling experience following the panel. that's not the case that you don't need to worry about that. were very pleased to have you out here with this morning. i would like to stress that our topic this morning i think is both particularly important, but also especially urgent. i don't think that it is an exaggeration to say that what happens with the security sectors in the arab world over the coming year or so, and by security service, i mean the police, the armed forces and most of all of course the very substantial intelligence apparatus is that exist in every arab country, that what happens with those sectors of the bureaucracy in the arab world will let her sleep determined the fate of
for example in egypt the brotherhood may be very reluctant on certain aspects of the security sector they're dealing with the military privileges of the military but other areas, for example, police, basic police reform and abuses and behavior of police i think my question and the brotherhood would be happy to see this corrected and improved, but that there is a perception within the brotherhood by many in the egyptian government institutions that if you were to address these issues it would result in its short term increase in crime and stability and they feel as though they can either fight crime effectively where they could address these kind of concerns which would be useful in the long term but detrimental in the short term and they would pay a heavy political price for the increase in crime on the basic security that would come with this reform. if you talk a little bit about that and also in tunisia i was there a couple of weeks ago, and one of the topics that came up quite a bit was the attacks on the u.s. embassy and while those of us here that might obviously highlight the need
in egypt and tunisia to push this forward and to overcome the increasing polarization. >> i will add to and dan's remarks and say in terms of technicalities and specific steps that need to be taken to reconfigure the domestic security establishment, they are all laid out there in a study that was put together by a group of civil society leaders as well as a group of meetings from the securities sector, commonly known as police for egypt. there's a great deal of debate within civil society about the exact concrete actionable step that needs to be taken in the short run and in the long run some of these steps when themselves to the type of changes that would require the liberation. this is one issue to keep in mind. the dialog's ideas are out there but what is missing as dan mentioned is the political will, the seriousness to engage in dialogue on this issue, even if they're not ready to adopt policy recommendations, there needs to be some kind of ongoing dialogue on these issues but at the same time i want to point out the issue of political will is important, there will always be a c
#% of all the foreign aid that we do, a lot of money. israel, egypt, pakistan, iraq, and afghanistan. nothing wrong with that, but we have to work with our frens to the south. we put in 1.4, and with additional money, it's $1.9 billion. for every one dollar we help with mexico, they spend $13. they spend a lot of money on security. they got to -- we got to understand what they are doing. now, what we started off, we did the easy thing, buy them hell cometters, buying this, and e worked with george bush, and filed the first legislation before bush talked about the plan because i felt that strongly about helping mexico, but nevertheless, we worked together. we did the easy thing with mexico, the helicopters and the planes. the hard part is this is we got to start training or billing the capacity, the prison systems, the prosecutors, the policemen. we're working on it at the federal level, and they trained 36,000 police. i think they need 150,000 or more than that. we have to go into judges, train the judges, the prosecutors. did you know that a prosecutor here in the united states, if
own passionate love affair in cape town, and then they reached suez in egypt on september 3rd, 1942. now i should probably give a little bit of background on the war in north africa. historian when they talk about it tend use metaphor like seesaw, pendulum, it was a peculiar sort of rhythm of war that began in the fall of 1940, moose lee knee had vision of grand door. he wanted to ride the white stallion down the street of cairo. he decided to make a play for cairo, attack the british going east, the british attacked right back, and drove the italians pretty far west in to libya, at which point hitler realized he needed to power. i don't think he was happy about it. he sent inner win, the famous take commander along with a bunch of [inaudible] and he effectively drove the british back in to egypt. the campaigning would seize and the two sides would give inspect in the fall of 1941, there was advance by the british in to libya in hopes of driving the access forces back. rommel turned around and pushed the british back again, and all the way this time, sort of disastersously deep in t
. >>> next, a discussion on the state of security forces in egypt, tunisia in libya. also the arab spurring countries are in a political transition with the army, police and intelligence services playing different roles in each country. hosted by the u.s. institute of peace, this is two hours. good morning everyone. i am steve heydemann for the middle east initiatives of the u.s. institute of peace, and we are delighted to see you all here today at the session on security sector reform in the arab world. i think some of those that rsvped may have been scared off by the false rumors that he would be colin following the panel. that is not the case. so you don't need to worry about that. we are very pleased to have you all here with us this morning. i would like to stress that our topic this morning i think is both particularly important, but also especially urgent. i don't think that it is an exaggeration to say that what happens with the securities sector within the arab world or over the coming year or so come and buy securities sectors i mean the police, the armed forces, and most of all t
identities. the fact that in egypt, the first thing they say is raise your head, you are an ejection, meaning be proud. so the question then is what happened? if this was true for a decade. there was nothing particularly unique about 2007 or 2011. whether there was a major economic crisis in egypt or tunisia. it was extraordinary and i don't think you can just blame it on economics. so the question is why didn't they do it before? i think we have the right answer. political sponsors have always assumed that it is not enough to have angry people to revolt. you have to organize and you have to get a lot of people through the streets and the government has to feel the heat. the fact you have a lot of angry people doesn't quite make it. governments understood that you can can't get people to the streets about organizing. the outline political parties. they kept tabs on social institutions. they put leaders in prison that challenge them. and they were under control. that is why some people are with us for the long haul. what happened over the last couple of years, we have been watching for a decad
that the spring is beneficial, we see that in egypt, this is not necessarily the case. the muslim brotherhood in egypt, the sunni islam that party with different views of regional policy. the egyptian president was in tehran recently for the non-aligned movement meeting and there is a lot of worry at him going to tehran would indicate that iran was isolated as the u.s. had imagined it to be or wanted it to be. more see meeting with iran officials indicated iran is an important regional player. of course what did morrissey during undreamed due? he criticized the regime of bashar al-assad and implicitly criticized the regime for his support of syria. this was an embarrassment for the iranian leadership, to the point that they change translation on television. he criticized syria and every man television set by rain. so trying to save face basically. but we've seen that egypt is not necessarily going to follow iran's policies in the region. in fact, the egyptians have kept their distance from tehran. they have not resumed relations in this a lot of tension in some issues. in addition, turkey eme
spring including the ongoing syrian civil war and the challenges facing egypt after its revolution. >> later today, singers and musicians roger daltrey and pete townsend of the who will be at the national press club to talk about the program they co-founded to help improve the lives of teenagers and young adults with cancer. they'll also discuss their plans for a new initiative called teen cancer america. it aims to set up hospitals and medical centers in the strategic areas across the country. see their remarks live beginning at 1 p.m. eastern over on c-span. >> you're watching c-span2 with politics and public atears. weak dies fee you are -- weekdays featuring live coverage of the senate and every weekend the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and get our schedule at our web site, and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. >> former national security adviser stephen hadley was among the speakers at a recent conference focusing on national security challenges facing the united states. he said the top priority should be getting
. and then they reached suez in egypt on september 3rd, 1942. now, i should probably give a little background on the war in north africa. historians when they talk about it tend to use metaphors like seesaw, pendulum. it was this peculiar sort of rhythm of war that began in the fall of 1940. mussolini had visions of grandeur, i guess, wanted to ride his white stallion down the streets of cairo. he had trooped in libya when was an italian colony, and he decided to make a play for cairo, attack the british going east. the british attacked right back and went, drove the italians pretty far west into libya at which point hitler realized he really needed to bail out his pal, mussolini, although i don't think he was happy about it. so he sent in irwin rommel, the famous tank commander, along with a bunch of perhapsers, and he effectively drove the british back into egypt. now, when the summer rolls around, things would kind of quiet down. it was terribly hot, and the campaigning would sort of cease, the two sides would dig in, and then in the fall of 1941 there was again an advance by the british into libya i
and his entourage and his inner circle, thought that syria might weather the arab storm that had hit egypt and tunisia, yemen, bahrain and libya. he gave an interview in january to a good friends of mine, jay sol low moan, with "the wall street journal" where he said syria was immune from the arab spring. some of the mouthpieces for the regime in february and march were publishing articles in syrian forums that were supportive of the protesters in egypt and tunisia, and there was a contrast made that they authoritarian leaders who were lackeys of the united states and israel, were out of touch with the youth ask the populations in their countries, whereas the president of syria was a young 45 at the time. he was a computer nerd. he liked the technological toys of the west. he was in touch with the syrian population. he certainly was not a lackey of the united states, and israel. in fact he was supported of hezbollah, amass, iran, and other groups and states, that had a lot of street credibility in the arab world. so they thought it would pass them over. in fact i know that president bashar
on the states because it's been a very fascinating story. egypt is still going through a revolution, halt asserted -- hasn't asserted itself, needs help from the rest of the world particularly economically. it can't be as assertive and play a role. iraq is not really fully integrated into the arab world left. what does that leave? syria is in trouble. that leaves the gulf cooperate council state led by saudi arabia. so what we have now is a coalition state, the gulf cooperation council around saudi arabia that invited two other states into the royal club, jordan and morocco, to broaden the gcc in exchange for economic and security cooperation going in different directions, and that is the coalition right now that is the powerful coalition in the arab world. and the states that are going through change are somewhat marginalized, there's no one else is so if you want to call that unity, go ahead. that's what we have. >> that's a problem. egypt will come back. >> it'll come back. >> and soon. >> and then in terms of identity politics, you get to a country like libya, you add the tribal -- >>
of peace looking at the state of security forces in egypt, tunisia and libya. the arab spring are in the state of transition with the army, police and intelligence services playing different roles in each. this took place earlier this week in washington. it's two hours. >> good morning everyone. i'm steve heydemann for issues of the u.s. institute of peace, and we are delighted to see you all here at today's session on the securities sector reform in the arab world and some rsvp to me have been scared by the false rumor that it would be subjected to a political polling experience following the panel. that is not the case. so you do not need to worry about that. we are very pleased to have you here with us all this morning. i would like to stress that our topic this morning i think is both particularly important but also especially urgent. i do not think that it is an exaggeration to say what happens with the security sectors in the arab world and by security sectors i mean the police, the armed forces, and most of all of course the very substantial intelligence apparatus that
way of thinking about how to organize political and commercial life. my guess is that egypt 10, 15 years from now will be a stable democracy, but they will have a view of order, commerce, religion and its relationship to politics that will look quite different from ours. finally, take the example of, say, india and brazil, countries that are already liberal democracies and secular. they are as well following their own path to modernity. actions by the fact that in part they are still largely rural and urban poor societies, not middle-class societies. and there's an assumption in this country that because they are democratic, they will side with us. well, i think some days they will side with us in the days they will side with other emerging powers. turkey, brazil, india, they are democratic powers but when you look at voting in the u.n., when you look at their position on iran, when you look at their position on other issues, they as often as not tide against the west rather than with the west, and that is a simpler by moving to a world in which there will be great diversity. as to
will not willfully step aside as we saw in tunisia, egypt and even in yemen. and i would argue probably is not amenable to any sort of negotiated solution. the second constant is that the opposition has been perpetually divided, fragmented, unable to coalesce around a unifying vision of a post-assad syria. we've seen divisions among the external opposition, we've seen divisions inside syria, we've seen divisions among the arms groups, divisions based on ideology, divisions based on patrons and so forth. and the third factor is that the international community has remained at a stalemate, has been unable to reach a consensus on how to move forward in syria. we've seen three security council vetoes by russia and china causing many to call the u.n., essentially, ineffective in this crisis. so it's been the interplay of these three factors, i would argue, that has led syria down the path that it has taken. in terms of u.s. policy, u.s. policy is based on the objective of having assad, as president obama called for, step aside. this was back in august of 2011. the problem with u.s. policy is
between egypt and yemen. i think we know that saudi arabia had mixed feelings about how quickly mubarak was dumped, and -- but they also, the saudis playeded a crucial role of easing yemen. it was not easy. it was slow. it was bloody, but compared to the other changes, it was not that bad. in april of to 20* -- 2011, just as the arab spring was in full bloom, if you will, the c7 finance ministers met in france and formed a partnership with the vision that was simple that europe had been through this kind of thing before. after eastern europe broke away
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